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The landmark Institute of Medicine Report, To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health Care System. 
stated that medical error causes 44,000 to 98,000 deaths per year. 1 There is no question that the 
report raised awareness of patient safety and stressed the importance of patient outcomes. 
Heightened awareness has produced a patient safety industry of sorts, with solutions that range 
from technology to outcomes measurement. 
Regulatory bodies, such as the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations 
(JCAHO), have recognized the need for patient safety to be embedded in the culture of healthcare 
organizations. In particular, the JCAHO has encouraged use of the root cause analysis process for 
investigating near miss and adverse events. This process emphasizes learning from system analysis 
over assigning individual blame, an approach used successfully in such high reliability organizations 
as the aviation industry and the military. 2,3 Many healthcare organizations have formulated 
nonpunitive reporting policies to encourage error reporting and to identify systems issues. This 
article discusses the importance of a work complexity and human factors focus, how blame will 
continue to surface as patient safety efforts are implemented, and implications for outcomes 
management. 
Removing Blame 
Although policies, organizational assessments, and regulations are an important starting point for 
best practice, these steps are neither sufficient to ensure changes in attitudes and behaviors related 
to human error nor adequate to deal with the implications of human factors inherent in real work 
situations. Even when an organization chooses to move beyond policies and truly embrace a change 
in culture, blame is not easily eliminated. Understanding the complexity of real work and the limits 
of human performance is essential to establishing and maintaining a nonpunitive culture and, 
subsequently, positive patient outcomes. 
Human Performance and Complexity of Work 
Understanding a near miss or adverse event, as well as the human decisions and performance 
that preceded it, requires understanding of the context or the situation surrounding the event. Near 
misses and errors occur when multiple gaps align despite an organization's well-intentioned 
defenses. Examples of the latter include policies, procedures, regulations, and budget. Practitioners 
work in dynamic, evolving situations, confronted by goal conflicts, obstacles, hazards, missing or 
ambiguous information, and co-worker behavior. 4 In most instances, practitioners practice 
successfully by adapting, anticipating, accommodating, reacting, and coping to produce desired and 
safe outcomes. 
A fundamental principle of human factors is that humans have limitations. Essential to any event 
review is the recognition that the complexity surrounding the situation is a contributor to an adverse 
event. It is important not to dismiss complexity by implying that practitioners can do things a certain 
way even if overwhelmed in any situation. In complex work situations, a predictable pattern of 
breakdown of human performance may include fixation failure, which is the failure to adapt or revise 
because of the diversion of attention and/or missing knowledge. Another predictable pattern is over-
reliance on familiar signs. 5 Some clinical work can become so ordinary that automatic behaviors 
lead to unintended slips resulting in error. 
What practitioners do with a great deal of accuracy in unpredictable and rapidly changing 
situations is to adapt and reprioritize continuously. Given new cues or information, trade-offs are 
made by practitioners to achieve best outcomes. For a practitioner with an overwhelming workload, 
predictable adaptations include trading accuracy for speed, reducing performance criteria, shedding 
and/or deferring tasks, and recruiting resources from other personnel. 
Unpredictability, time pressures, ambiguity, and stress are characteristics common to the 
healthcare environment. Understanding this complex environment is important so that systems are 
designed to support practitioners in their work. Blaming individuals after near-miss and adverse 
events precludes and often replaces the search for understanding of the complexity surrounding 
situations. Successful change from a blame culture to a nonblame culture may be gained by 
analyzing some of the more subtle organizational signs that indicate further attention is needed. 
Subtle Signs of Blame 
By now, most practitioners and organizations recognize that it does not solve a systems problem 
to fire or discipline the staff person who made the error. However, blame can lurk in some 
identifiable behavior patterns. Rather than blame an individual directly, these subtle signs of blame 
still focus on individual behavior, do not address the systems issues, and accordingly do not produce 
positive and lasting patient outcomes. Following are some identifiable subtle signs of blame. 
Conclusion: Human Error 
Root cause analyses are meant to address systems issues. It is tempting to conclude after a 
review that human error was the culprit. The contributors that preceded the end point of human 
error are the factors that will lead eventually to a future event. When human error is the conclusion, 
nothing is proposed as needing further attention. Work complexity issues are not addressed. Not 
only does focusing on human error as the conclusion reflect blame of individuals for failure, it also 
precludes learning about how a similar event may be prevented in the future. 
Obvious Error: Lazy Review 
It is tempting to exclude certain errors or near misses from review because it is "obvious" what 
caused the event. This tendency to jump to conclusions illustrates the concept of hindsight 
bias. 6 Hindsight bias is the tendency to simplify the sequence of events after the fact. Although the 
human tendency toward hindsight bias is apparent in every organization, increased awareness 
before and during every review to prevent assignment of blame is crucial for learning. Accepting the 
"obvious" conclusion as the final interpretation of an event misses the opportunity to understand 
the event and improve the system and outcome. 
Silo Review 
A variation of hindsight bias is the silo review. Individual disciplines may understand the 
complexity of their own work and apply nonblame approaches to learn from error. However, 
because a practitioner may not understand the work of other disciplines in the same way, the 
tendency is to resort to simplistic assumptions about work complexity in relation to other disciplines. 
Failure to Transfer Knowledge 
As an organization develops a culture of safety, some staff will apply the knowledge gained from 
understanding work complexity to a specific patient safety initiative and implement system changes 
successfully. However, the same staff may not transfer the principles of nonblame and work 
complexity to the next patient safety situation. To the staff member, a different patient safety issue 
may seem unrelated to the last project such that the underlying work complexity framework is not 
applied. 
Using New Language to Perpetuate Old Beliefs 
The patient safety movement has a language. Although staff may learn patient safety terms and 
theories, some try to use the new language to fit old behaviors. For example, the "Swiss cheese 
model" adapted from Reason 7 is a valuable and commonly used representation to explain failure in 
complex systems. In this model, the gaps, illustrated by the holes in the slices of Swiss cheese, line 
up and result in an error. The slices illustrate different organizational points of defense or operations 
such as staffing guidelines or the process for product purchasing decisions. When reviewing an 
event, a staff member familiar with the Swiss cheese model may list multiple individuals as the 
points of breakdown or gaps in the system rather than actual systems issues. 
Re-education 
When reviewing an event, one of the easiest fixes is to re-educate staff regarding a process. This 
should not be the only improvement strategy done after a patient event for two reasons. First, re-
education regarding a policy or process assumes that the policy or process is correct. Second, re-
education obliquely implies that if the staff member had followed the policy properly, the event 
would not have occurred. Without a work complexity analysis in relation to the patient event, both 
assumptions are most likely incorrect. 
Tighten up the Policy 
Another popular way to address a systems issue is to "strengthen" an existing policy. Policies and 
procedures are a necessary part of patient care. Policies are most effective when they take into 
account work complexity and incorporate flexibility. Adding steps to a policy that do not reflect the 
way work is performed will not necessarily reduce the likelihood of future similar errors. 
Implications for Outcomes Management 
Implementation of best practices, new procedures, new technology, and/or policies is dependent 
on how well the change fits within the context of the real work of practitioners. Once change is 
implemented, evaluation of whether the achievement of outcomes was successful, partially 
successful, or a failure requires understanding of practitioner work in the context of real situations. 
Next steps in the failed implementation of a change may have nothing to do with re-education but 
more to do with how to support practitioners in dealing with the work change as a result of the new 
process. 
Learning about real work and achieving outcomes can be generated through reviews of near-miss 
and adverse events when the focus of reviews is on systems, not individuals. Subtle signs of blame 
may continue despite ongoing education regarding patient safety; recognition of subtle signs of 
blame reflects self-awareness as an organization moves toward high patient safety reliability. 
Organizational interventions should include ongoing reinforcement of rationale for nonblame 
approaches and facilitation of focused system reviews after near-miss and adverse events. Most 
importantly, understanding the real work environment is essential before any change is 
implemented. 
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